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Abstract:   
The supply of deceased donor organs is a limiting factor for transplantation based therapies.  
This research utilizes a laboratory experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of alternative public 
policies targeted at increasing the rate of deceased donor organ donation. The experiment 
includes treatments across different default choices (opt-in versus opt-out) and organ allocation 
rules (without versus with priority rule) inspired by the donor registration systems applied in 
different countries.  Furthermore, the experiment includes a controlled treatment to measure the 
effects of a neutral versus descriptive framing of the decision task.  Our results indicate that the 
opt-out system with priority rule generates the largest increase in organ donation relative to an 
opt-in only program.  However, sizeable gains are achievable using either a priority rule or opt-
out program separately, with the opt-out rule generating approximately 80% of the benefits 
achieved under a priority rule program. 
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Between 2000 and 2009 the annual number of deceased organ donors within the United States 
(U.S.) increased from 5,985 to 8,022 (Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR) 2012).  
Although this represents a 34% increase in deceased donors, it has not kept pace with the rapidly 
risen waiting list.  During this same time interval the number of patients waiting for an organ 
transplant has increased from 74,635 to 111,027 patients, a 49% increase (SRTR 2012).   Both in 
absolute and relative terms there is an ever increasing gap between the number of deceased 
donor organs and those waiting for a transplant.
1
  Despite the large need for transplantable 
organs, only 42.7% of residents in the U.S. over the age of 18 are registered organ donors.
2
  
Clearly, the current organ supply system in the United States fails to produce an adequate supply 
to satisfy the demand for transplantable organs and there is an increasing need to close this gap 
and increase human welfare.  In this paper we experimentally investigate whether or not changes 
in the organ donation default choices as well as organ allocations can effectively increase organ 
donation and facilitate the closing of this gap.    
The experimental design is inspired by different donor registration and organ allocation 
systems currently applied in other countries.  The U.S. system serves as a baseline for 
comparison where current donor registration is an opt-in program and the organ allocation 
system does not assign priority to those who are willing to be donors themselves.  We compare 
this institution to an opt-out donor registration system inspired by the current system in Spain 
and Austria, an opt-in with a priority allocation rule inspired by Israel and an opt-out with 
priority rule system inspired by Singapore.  Our results indicate that the opt-out system with 
priority rule generates the largest donation rates, with the largest marginal gains arising from the 
priority rule allocation system.  Our results are consistent with the findings of Kessler and Roth 
(2012) who found that a priority rule allocation program will increase donation rates, but we 
complement their finding to encompass the opt-out rule which is currently being utilized in other 
countries.    
                                                          
1 
It is worth noting that the reported deaths while in the waiting list per 1,000 patient years at risks has decreased 
from 104.6 in 2000 to 84.5 in 2009 (SRTR 2012).  This is primarily due the advancements in care for these patients 
and not a function of increased transplantation. 
2
 Based on the 2012  National Donor Designation Report Card by the Donate Life America at 
http://donatelife.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/DLA-Report-Card-2012-350781.pdf 
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Although there are a large number of living donors within the U.S., there is currently 0.8 
living donors for each deceased donor, we focus on deceased donation as the number of potential 
deceased donors is far above the number of current deceased donors and many types of organ 
transplantation rely exclusively on deceased donation.
3
  Approaches to increase the organ supply 
from deceased donation broadly fall into two classes: improving the donation rates of eligible 
deceased donors and enlarging the pool of potential donors.  The donation rates can be improved 
by increasing the consent rates from the potential donors’ next-of-kin.  Since first drafted in 1968, 
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) provides that an individual’s statement of intent to be 
an organ donor is legally binding (Bonnie et al., 2008).  However, it is still common practice to 
ask the permission of the deceased’s next-of-kin to donate their organs.  Along this vein, the 
department of Health and Human Service (HHS) passed regulation that requires all hospitals to 
report all deaths to the Organ Procurement Organization (OPO).
4
  This regulation increases the 
opportunity that the deceased’s next-of-kin is contacted for organ donation.   
Policymakers have made efforts to increase the donation rate through regulation and 
improvements to the organ procurement system.  In the U.S. an organ procurement organization 
(OPO) is in charge of the procurement of deceased-donor organs.  There are 58 such 
organizations from different regions throughout the U.S. and each regional OPO obtains direct 
contact with the deceased’s next-of-kin.  In April 2003, HHS launched the Organ Donation 
Breakthrough Collaborative to improve the donation rate.
5
  The goal of the collaborative is to 
encourage adoption of “best practices” for increasing access to transplantable organs.  Recent 
research suggests that the collaborative has increased organ donation within the U.S. (Howard et 
al., 2007; Shafer et al., 2008).     
Another approach to increase the organ supply is to enlarge the pool of potential donors or 
generating a higher registration rate among the population.  Our experiment is targeted at this 
                                                          
3 
While a live donor can give a kidney, or a portion of the liver, lung, intestine, or pancreas, it is essentially 
impossible for live donation of solid organs such as the heart, pancreas, and intestinal organs. 
4
 This policy was announced in June 1998. HHS Announcement: http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/1998pres/980617 
.html 
5
 The Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative began in 2003 at the request of HHS Secretary Tommy G. 
Thompson. 
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mechanism for increasing the organ supply as we measure the relative effectiveness of potential 
policy changes that target increasing the number of potential donors.  Our paper is novel in that 
we conduct a controlled lab experiment to compare policy regimes with different institutions 
surrounding organ donation registration that currently exist in the world today.  Results from the 
experiment will inform the discussion of possible changes in public policy towards organ 
donation.  We consider two highly publicized proposals: changing the default of organ donation 
registration and changing the organ allocation rule.   
Changing the default option affects decision-making.  Economists have highlighted the 
substantial role that defaults play in numerous areas, including health care plans (Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser, 1988), automobile insurance (Johnson et al., 1993), retirement saving plans 
(Madrian and Shea, 2001) and consent to online privacy policies (Johnson et al., 2002).  Results 
show that people often choose the default option to which they are assigned, suggesting that 
changing the default choice of the organ donation question may influence donation decisions.  
The U.S. operates an opt-in policy regime so that the individual must self-select and register to 
be an organ donor.  In other words, the current default choice in the U.S. is non-donor.  One 
proposed policy alternative is to change the default option to being a donor, what is referred to as 
an opt-out system.  Under an opt-out regime, an individual must self-select out of being an organ 
donor. 
Altering the default choice influences donation decisions through various channels (Johnson 
and Goldstein, 2003).  First, the default may be considered as the recommended action by the 
policy-maker.  For example, if the default is that an individual has consented to be a donor, 
potential donors might believe being a donor is recommended by policy-makers.  Second, 
accepting the default may involve less effort for the individual making decisions.  
Psychologically, the organ donation decision may induce stress from thoughts of dying or pain 
suffered by family members should their organs be donated.  Researching the information about 
organ donation and filling out registration forms also involves time and physical effort.  These 
costs are upfront burdens placed upon organ donation registration and intensified when the 
default option is non-donor (captured by the opt-in rule within our experiment). 
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Several European countries like Spain and Austria have adopted an opt-out system for organ 
donation, while some other European countries like Germany and the United Kingdom have opt-
in default options.  Using data reported in Gäbel (2002), Johnson and Goldstein (2003; 2004) 
compare donation registration rates across European countries with different default options.  
They find that the default has a large impact with opt-out countries having higher registration 
rates.  One potential problem of this method is the assumption that all other observable 
characteristics can be controlled for and unobservable characteristics are not correlated with 
donation registration across countries.  We provide support for these empirical results using a 
laboratory setting where outside confounders do not exist. 
Changing the organ allocation rule is another potential way to increase the pool of registered 
donors.  The current organ allocation system in U.S. is organized by the United Network for 
Organ Sharing (UNOS).  UNOS maintains a national waiting list.  Transplant candidates on the 
list are ranked, among other things, according to the candidate’s health condition, physical 
compatibility between the donor and the candidate (i.e., the Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) 
matching),
6
 their distance from the potential donor, the patient’s preferences for particular donor 
types (i.e., is the patient willing to accept an Extended Criteria Donor (ECD) organ) and how 
long the candidate has been on the waiting list.  When a transplantable organ becomes available, 
the opportunity goes to the highest-ranked person on the list.  Under the current allocation 
system utilized by UNOS an individual is not given priority if they have elected to be a potential 
donor.   A proposed change is to utilize a priority rule for allocation.
7
   
A priority rule allocation system gives individuals who are on the organ waiting list and are 
registered organ donors precedence for transplantable organs.  In other words, the priority rule 
establishes the top criterion for ranking on the waiting list by whether a person is registered as an 
organ donor or not.  Individuals who are registered donors rank higher on the waiting list than 
those who are not, despite their medical condition or other differences.  The supporters of the 
priority rule believe that the current organ allocation system in the U.S. does not provide enough 
incentive for organ donation by purely relying on altruism.  The priority rule motivates an 
                                                          
6
 A zero HLA mismatch with a particular donor will automatically move a patient up the waiting queue. 
7 The final decision to utilize an organ is made by the transplant surgeon.  However, changes in the allocation 
mechanism will alter the distribution of organ offers. 
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individual to donate by connecting the potential of helping others to the potential of helping 
one’s self.  The results from our experiment validate this motivation. 
Israel and Singapore are examples of countries that have adopted a priority rule for their 
national donation system.  Israel has been using the priority rule system since 2010 (Lavee et al., 
2010).
8
  However, Israeli citizens need to elect to be included as a registered donor to receive 
priority over those not willing to be donors.  Singapore passed the Human Organ Transplant Act 
(HOTA) in 1987, which applies the priority rule with an opt-out system.
9
  In Singapore, citizens 
are assumed to be organ donors, but any person who objects to HOTA can elect not to be 
included.  If a person objects to donate his organs upon death, he automatically gives up priority 
for receiving an organ should they need one in future.  Therefore, the policy currently 
implemented in Singapore combines all the features that may increase organ donation over the 
current U.S. paradigm. 
Our experimental design complements the recent work of Kessler and Roth (2012).  Kessler 
and Roth design a laboratory experiment to test for changes in the decision to register as a donor 
from alterations in allocation rule (i.e., priority rule) and the using of financial incentives (i.e., a 
rebate and discount).  As mentioned earlier, Kessler and Roth illustrate that organ donation rates 
will increase if one elects to utilize a priority rule for organ allocation.  Our research extends this 
research in two important dimensions. One, we investigate whether or not the results expressed 
in Kessler and Roth (2012) are a construct of the neutral framing used in their experiment as the 
terms organ and organ donation are not used.  Secondly, we investigate whether or not the 
utilization of an opt-out versus an opt-in decision rule combined with a priority and no priority 
rule can yield further increases in organ donation.  The later being extremely important as it 
investigates the marginal effects of other countries policies on the organ donation decision.  
                                                          
8 
The new organ allocation policy was first suggested to the Israel National Transplant Council (INTC) in 2006.  It 
was put into effect in January 2010.  The new policy can be found as the Organ Transplant Law 5768-2008, Israeli 
Book of Laws (English translation provided by the Israeli Ministry of Justice). 
9 
Details of the Human Organ Transplant Act can be found at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p; 
page=0;query=DocId%3Adb05e985-f8a0-4d61-a906-9fd39f3b5ac9%20Depth%3A0%20ValidTime%3A02%2F01% 
2F2011%20TransactionTime%3A31%2F07%2F2005%20Status%3Ainforce;rec=0;whole=yes 
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Our research can be used to further inform the policy debate surrounding the current organ 
donation system.  We not only compare the alternative policies (opt-out and priority allocation 
rule) to the current U.S. donation system, but we also test the relative effectiveness of different 
alternative policies in an effort to decompose their marginal effects.  In addition, we further 
evaluate the combination of the opt-out and priority allocation rule.  The opt-out with priority 
system, as discussed by Breyer and Kliemt (2007) and utilized by Singapore, provides a dual-
incentive for donation: avoiding the cost of opting-out and receiving priority on the waiting list.  
A concern with combining the opt-out and priority allocation system is that the priority rule 
cannot prevent the free-rider problem if the introduction of opt-out system already generated 
sufficient organ supply (Breyer and Kliemt 2007).  Investigating this using observational data 
would be infeasible but within our experiment we can investigate whether or not this concern is 
valid.  Our result suggests that the combination of opt-out and priority rule is significantly more 
effective in increasing registration rates than each of the other policies. 
An additional advancement we make is that the instructions to subjects in our experiment are 
stated in terms of organs.  The framing choice that should be applied in the experimental study of 
policy evaluation is controversial.  The reason we choose descriptive framing here is that we 
believe the organ donation decision involves significant psychological issues and costs that 
cannot be captured by abstract terms.  To measure the impact of framing on experimentally-
observed donation decision, we included an additional treatment, in which the instructions are 
stated in abstract terms.  By doing this, we are able to discuss the impact on the decision to 
donate ‘tokens’ or donate ‘organs’.  Our results indicate that our findings are robust to the 
framing of the experiment. 
In the following section, we present our behavioral hypotheses.  In Section Two, we outline 
the experimental design we utilize to investigate our hypotheses on the impact that the opt-out 
versus opt-in and priority allocation rule have on the organ donation decision.  In Section Three 
we discuss the results from the experiment and in the final section we summarize our findings. 
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I. Behavioral Hypotheses 
We designed an incentivized laboratory experiment to evaluate the relative effectiveness of 
different organ donation mechanisms.  We adopted a two-by-two design illustrated in Table 1 
with the dimensions being the opt-in versus opt-out decision rule combined with the presence or 
absence of the priority allocation rule.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The Control treatment models the current status quo of the U.S. donation system, where 
subjects are non-donors by default and no one is granted priority for being a registered donor.  
The Opt-out treatment is different from the Control treatment only in the default choice of the 
donation decision.  As we discussed, there are costs associated with making active organ 
donation decision.  In our experiment, we model these costs as a simple monetary cost, which is 
charged if a subject deviates from the default.  Being an organ donation in the Opt-out treatment 
is less costly than in the Control treatment.  This leads to the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, changing the default choice of the donation decision from opt-
in to opt-out increases the donation registration rate. 
The only difference between the Control treatment and the Priority treatment is the organ 
allocation rule.  In the Priority treatment, subjects who are registered donors receive priority 
when they need an organ, while non-donors are only able to access available organs when the 
needs of the registered donors on the waiting list are satisfied.  Under the priority rule, donors 
can jump in front of non-donors on the waiting list.  That is, the priority rule increases the 
probability that donors who need an organ will receive one if they are registered donors.  This 
leads to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, changing the organ allocation rule by adding donors’ priority 
increases the donation registration rate. 
In addition to comparing each alternative mechanism with the current status quo, we are also 
interested in the relative effectiveness of changing the default choice and changing the organ 
allocation rule.  More formally, we test the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, changing the current status quo to the opt-out system yields 
the same level of increase in the donation rate as changing to the priority rule system. 
The Opt-out with Priority treatment combines the effect of changing both the default choice 
(reducing the cost of donation registration) and changing the organ allocation rule (increasing the 
benefit of donation).  It would be expected that the dual-incentives working congruently will be 
more effective than in the singular case.  There is some concern, however, that if the change to 
an opt-out default choice increases donation registration significantly such that individuals are 
gaining very little from the priority allocation rule, then the combination of the policies may not 
result in higher donation rates.  In this case, the dual-incentives will not be more effective.  We 
test the following hypothesis on the combination of the opt-out and priority allocation rule: 
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, changing the default choice and the organ allocation rule 
together generates the same level of increase in donation registration rate as changing only one 
of them. 
The framing of the decision task may impact the decision to be donor or not within the 
experiment.  An additional advantage of our experiments is the ability to formally investigate the 
framing effect.  We conducted an additional treatment, a neutral framing of the Control treatment 
(opt-in combined without priority), to investigate the impact that our contextual framing of the 
decision process had on subject behavior.  This generates our last research hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: Ceteris paribus, subjects behave the same when the experiment is framed in 
abstract terms as when the experiment is framed in term of organs. 
 
II. Experimental Design 
There were 30 rounds in each session of the experiment and a finite number of periods in each 
round.  Subjects were unaware of the number of rounds, but they were informed at the beginning 
of the experiment that only one round would be randomly selected to be paid at the end of the 
experiment.  Each subject was a virtual human in the lab who had one A organ and two B 
organs.
10
  In each period, subjects had a 10% probability of an A organ failure and a 20% 
                                                          
10 
Kessler and Roth (2012) have the design of one A units with two B units, where A represents brain and B 
10 
 
probability of a B organ failure (both B organs fail together).
11
  If a subject encountered an A 
organ failure, she ceased to participate in that round.  Whenever a subject’s B organs failed, she 
was placed on a waiting list to receive one B organ donated by another subject.
12
  Subjects 
waiting for a B organ were not subjected to the probability of an A organ failure.  Each subject 
with a B organ failure had up to 5 periods to stay on the waiting list.  If she did not receive a B 
organ within this time period, she ceased to participate in that round.  
At the beginning of each round, subjects were asked to make a decision about whether they 
wanted to register as an organ donor (the opt-in rule) or withdraw from the donor registry (the 
opt-out rule).  Since we only focus on the donation registration decision not the procurement 
process, we utilized a strong version of donation in our experiment, in which registering as a 
donor implies being a donor upon death in the experiment. 
Subjects were told that they would earn $3 in each period that they had one active A organ 
and at least one active B organ.  However, subjects were not able to earn any money when they 
were on the waiting list or no longer actively participating in the round.  All donation decisions 
were made at the beginning of each period before knowing whether or not they would have an 
organ failure.  All subjects were told that if they chose to be a donor and their A organ failed first 
each of their B organs would be donated to one of the subjects who were on the waiting list in 
that period.  However, if their B organs failed first, their active A organ could not be donated.  In 
addition, if they received a B organ from others, the donated B organ could not be donated again.   
There were costs involved with the donation decision.
13
  Subjects were told that they had to 
pay $0.75 to make an active donation decision (override the default choice).  This cost can be 
thought as the psychological and physical costs associate with overriding the default choice, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
represents kidney.  We keep the consistent design so that the results of our experiment are comparable.  
11 
These parameters are identical to those have been used by Kessler and Roth (2012).  We also conducted additional 
sensitivity analyses, discussed in Appendix A, specific to our design to ensure they are appropriate.  
12
 The assumption here is that a subject can function normally with one B organ donated by another subject. 
13
 Obviously, these costs associated with organ donation cannot be measured.  Here we impose these costs merely to 
model the incentives involved in organ donation.  Since the costs vary as the default choice changes, we divide the 
costs into two parts, the cost of overriding the default and the cost of donation act.  
11 
 
which was charged regardless of the donation outcome.  Subjects were also told that the act of 
donating organs would cost them $2.25.  This donation cost can be thought as the psychological 
costs of organ procurement.  Thus, one’s payoff for each round is equal to the earnings in that 
round minus the costs they incurred for overriding the default decision as well as donating 
organs.  At the end of the experiment, only one round was randomly selected for payment.  
Subjects were told at the beginning of the experiment that if in the selected round their payoff 
was negative, the extra costs would be charged from their $10 show-up fee.   
After making the donation decision at the beginning of each round, subjects observed their 
outcome for each period, their earnings of each period, and their accumulated earnings for that 
round.  After experiencing a B organ failure, the subject began to receive the waiting list 
information.  The waiting list information provide subjects with information on how many 
periods they had been waiting, their rank on the waiting list and whether they received a B organ 
in that period.  A screenshot of the information screen presented to the subjects is shown in 
Figure 1.  Subjects who ceased to participate in the round were not able to observe any more 
information until a new round started. 
 [Insert Figure 1 here] 
To investigate our five experimental hypotheses we conducted four organ-framed 
treatments ― the Control treatment, the Opt-out treatment, the Priority treatment and the Opt-
out with Priority treatment ― and one neutral-framed treatment.  In the following, we provide 
more detail on the five different treatments used in the experiment. 
Control Treatment 
In this treatment, subjects were not organ donors by default.  Those who wished to register as 
donors were charged $0.75 to change their status.  Subjects were told that being an organ donor 
might potentially affect others’ earnings.  The donation decision was described in the experiment 
as follows: 
“In this round, you are not an organ donor by default.  If you want to 
change your status to be a donor, please check the box below; 
otherwise, please leave it empty. 
12 
 
□ I hereby agree to donate my organs after I cease to participate in 
this round.” 
Subjects were also told that if they chose to be an organ donor, after their A organ failed, 
their active B organs would be donated to those in need in the order of their rank on the waiting 
list.  The rank on the waiting list was determined by the length of time the subjects had been 
waiting for a B organ.  Subjects who had been waiting longer were ranked higher.  The rank of 
subjects who had the same waiting time was randomly determined.  For example, if there were 
two subjects on the waiting list and subject 1 had been waiting for 4 periods and subject 2 had 
been waiting for 3 periods,  subject 1 ranked higher than subject 2. 
Opt-out Treatment 
In the Opt-out treatment, subjects were registered organ donors by default.  Those who 
wished to withdraw their donor registry were charged $0.75 to opt out.  The choice of this 
treatment was described as follows: 
“In this round, you are an organ donor by default.  If you want to 
change your status to be a non-donor, please check the box below; 
otherwise, please leave it empty. 
□ I hereby object to donate my organs after I cease to participate in 
this round.” 
Unless a subject responded that he or she did not want to be considered a potential organ 
donor, their active B organs were donated after an A organ failure occurred.  Organs were 
provided to those in need according to their rank on the waiting list.  Subjects on the waiting list 
were ranked by the length of time they had been waiting on the list, and subjects who had been 
waiting longer were ranked higher. 
Priority Treatment 
   The Priority treatment is different from the Control treatment only in the ranking rule used 
for the waiting list.  In this treatment, the default option for the donation decision was not to be 
an organ donor.  Before making the donation decision, all subjects were informed that those who 
chose to be an organ donor would be given priority ranking on the waiting list.  Therefore, 
13 
 
subjects on the waiting list in this treatment were ranked on the basis of two criteria: first their 
donation decision, and second the length of time they had been waiting on the list.  For example, 
if subject 1 is a non-donor who had been waiting for 4 periods and subject 2 is a registered donor 
who had been waiting for 3 periods, subject 2 ranked higher than subject 1. 
Opt-out with Priority Treatment 
The Opt-out with Priority treatment is different from the Control treatment in both the 
default option and the ranking rule on the waiting list.  In this treatment, subjects were registered 
organ donors by default.  Before making the donation decision, all subjects were informed that 
those who withdraw their donor registration would automatically give up their priority ranking 
on the waiting list.  Transplantable organs would be provided to registered donors before non-
donors. 
The description of the decision environment to the subjects in the four treatments above was 
stated in terms of organ donations.  We conducted an additional treatment, in which the 
instructions to subjects were neutrally-framed, to control the effect of the experiment framing.   
Neutral Treatment 
In the Neutral treatment, we adopted the same default option and ranking rule on the waiting 
list as the Control treatment.  The only difference is that the experiment description was phrased 
in abstract terms, not in terms of organs.  Subjects were informed that they would be assigned 
three tokens in each round: one A token and two B tokens.  In each period, each subject had a 10% 
probability of losing their A token and a 20% probability of losing both B tokens.  Subjects 
would earn $3 in each period that they had one A token and at least one B token.  The donation 
decision in this treatment was described as follows: 
 “In this round, you are not a donor by default.  If you want to change 
your status to be a donor, please check the box below; otherwise, 
please leave it empty. 
□ I hereby agree to donate my B tokens after I cease to participate in 
this round.” 
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We conducted eighteen experimental sessions with 15 subjects in each session.  In twelve 
sessions, subjects played 15 rounds in one of the organ-framed treatments followed by 15 rounds 
of another one of the organ-framed treatments (for example, subjects participated in the Control 
treatment for rounds 1-15 and then the Opt-out treatment for rounds 16-30).  In these sessions, 
subjects were stopped after round 15 and told that they would start a new treatment.  Subjects 
were handed the instruction of the new treatment and the experimenter clearly explained all 
changes in the rules.   
In three of the remaining sessions, subjects played the Control treatment in all 30 rounds, 
while in the last three treatments subjects played the neutral treatment in all 30 rounds.  In these 
sessions, subjects were also stopped after round 15.  They were told that they would start a new 
treatment, but there were no changes in the rules of the game.  The experimenter reviewed all the 
rules of the game.  All types of treatment combination are shown in Table 2.  Lastly, the 
selection of which session to conduct among the eighteen sessions was randomly determined.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
At the end of each session, the subjects were presented with a brief questionnaire on their 
demographic characteristics and their involvement with organ donation in their own lives.  They 
received payment after they completed the questionnaire. 
 
III. Results 
The experiment was performed at the Georgia State University Experimental Economics Center 
(ExCEN).  Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate student body using a recruiting 
program that randomly invites registered subjects to participate in the experiment.  A total of 270 
subjects participated in the experiment and the average payment was $18.03.
14
  Table 3 presents 
the descriptive statistics for the experiment.  There are 8100 observations at the subject-round 
level.  The average donation registration rate for all treatments is 41.5%.  The average donation 
rates by treatment were as follows: Opt-out with Priority (70.8%), Priority (61.3%), Opt-out 
(48.8%), Control (25.3%), and Neutral (17.8%).  The descriptive statistics clearly indicate that 
                                                          
14
 The experiment was conducted using the experimental software z-Tree 3.3.6 (Fishbacher 2007). 
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the highest average donation rates arise when the priority rule is utilized.  This finding is 
consistent with that of Kessler and Roth (2012), but the descriptive statistics also illustrate that 
substantial gains can be achieved using just an opt-out policy.   
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of subjects who were registered organ donors (those who 
either opted in or did not opt out) in each round of the experiment for each treatment.  The line 
breaks indicate that subjects were stopped after round 15 in each session and restarted a new 
treatment from round 16 through 30.  Figure 2 suggests that changing the default option and/or 
altering the organ allocation rule has a significant positive impact on the donor registration rate 
across all 30 rounds.  The Control treatment lies beneath the three other organ-framed treatments 
regardless of being played in the first or last 15 rounds.  Figure 2 also suggests that the 
experiment framing plays an important role.  The organ-framed treatment generates higher 
average donation registration rate than the neutral-framed treatment.  This difference in 
registration rate across treatment is even more notable in the last 15 rounds.   
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
To more rigorously investigate the treatment differences a series of Wilcoxon rank sum tests 
were conducted comparing the donation decisions of subjects across treatments.  The results 
from these tests are illustrated in Table 4.  The test statics are conducted using three different 
data partitions.  The first pools all of the data across rounds, the second focuses on the first 15 
rounds in the experiment and the third partition is for the last 15 rounds.  The results from all of 
the Wilcoxon rank sum tests clearly indicate that the donation decisions across treatments are 
statistically different from one another.  They are also consistent with the observation that the 
donation rate is highest in the Opt-out with Priority treatment and the lowest is the Neutral 
treatment. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
We additionally conducted a series of probit regressions to investigate the marginal effect of 
different mechanisms on organ donation decisions.  The results are illustrated in Table 5.  The 
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independent variables in the probit regressions include four treatment dummy variables Opt-out, 
Priority, Opt-out/priority, and Neutral corresponding with the different cells of the experimental 
design (Model 1).  The reference group is the donation decision in the Control treatment, which 
is the opt-in system currently used in the U.S.  We further control whether a decision is made in 
the first 15 rounds or in last 15 rounds of the experiment using a dummy variable interaction 
term (Model 2).  The dummy variable Second Treatment equals to 1 if a treatment is played in 
the last 15 rounds and it is interacted with the four primary treatment dummies in Model 1.  
Regression Models 3 and 4 control for the effect of information in the previous round on the 
donor registration decision.  Earnings Last Round represents earnings from the previous round 
(Model 3).  Received an Organ Last Round is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the subject 
received an organ donated by others in the previous round.  Benefit of Organ Received Last 
Round captures the earnings from the previous round after receiving an organ (Model 4).  Lastly, 
regression Model 5 includes demographic control variables Male, White, and Donor in Real Life.  
The following of this section provides more detailed results from the experiment broken down by 
our five primary research hypotheses. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
Focusing on our first research hypothesis the results for the experiment validate our 
hypothesis that the opt-out rule generates a higher donor registration rate than the opt-in rule.  
Figure 2 illustrates that the opt-out rule has a significant positive impact on the donor registration 
rate in all rounds.  Across all rounds, the Opt-out treatment has an average donation rate of 
48.8%, which is almost twice the average donation rate of 25.3% in the Control treatment.  Over 
the first 15 rounds, the Opt-out treatment had an average donation rate of 53.8%, while the 
Control treatment had a much lower average rate of 27.7%.  Over rounds 16-30, the Opt-out 
treatment had a rate of 43.9%, while the Control treatment only had a rate of 22.9%.  Results 
from the non-parametric tests in Table 4 are consistent with the observation that the Control 
treatment had a statistically significant lower donor registration rate than the Opt-out treatment 
regardless of being played in the first or last 15 rounds.  The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are -
14.988, -11.493 and -9.713 for pooled data, first 15 rounds and last 15 rounds of the experiment 
respectively when comparing the Control treatment with the Opt-out treatment. 
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The probit regressions in Table 5 also support our first research hypothesis.  The positive and 
highly statistically significant coefficient on the Opt-out dummy variable in regression Model 1 
indicates that subjects are about 25% more likely to register as a donor in the Opt-out treatment 
than in the Control treatment across all 30 rounds.  Furthermore, this finding is robust to the 
additional controls used in the other econometric specifications (Models 2 through 5).  This 
represents an almost 100% increase in the donor registration rate over the 25.3% donor 
registration rate observed in the Control treatment. This finding suggests a significant increase in 
donation rate can be achieved by just introducing the opt-out rule.  
 In order to test our second research hypothesis we must compare the Control treatment (the 
baseline opt-in without priority system) with the Priority treatment as well as the Opt-out 
treatment with the Opt-out with Priority treatment.  A statistically significant and higher donor 
registration rate for the Priority and Opt-out with Priority treatments will support our second 
research hypothesis.  Figure 2 illustrate that the Priority treatment has a higher average donation 
registration rate than the Control treatment in all rounds.  The average donation rate for the 
Priority treatment is 61.3% over all rounds, 59.6% over the first 15 rounds, and 63.0% over the 
last 15 rounds.  A higher donation rate is also observed in the Opt-out with Priority treatment 
when compared to the Opt-out treatment.  The average donation rate for this treatment was 70.8% 
over all rounds, 73.2% for the first 15 rounds and 68.4% for last 15 rounds.     
The Wilcoxon rank sum tests also demonstrate that the Control treatment generates 
statistically significantly lower donation registration rates than the Priority treatment over all 
rounds as well as in rounds 1-15 and rounds 16-30 separately.  The test statistics are -22.309, -
13.895, and -17.680 when comparing the Control treatment with the Priority treatment for all the 
rounds, rounds 1-15 and rounds 16-30 respectively.  The results comparing the Opt-out treatment 
with the Opt-out with Priority treatment are similar to those observed when comparing the 
Control treatment with the Priority treatment, adding the priority allocation rule increases the 
rate of organ donation.  The Wilcoxon rank sum test statistics are -11.656, -7.402 and -9.102 
when comparing the total rounds, rounds 1-15 and rounds 16-30 respectively.  This said, the 
marginal differences between the Opt-out treatment and the Opt-out with Priority treatment are 
not as large as when comparing the Control treatment with the Priority treatment since the donor 
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registration rate increased only 45% whereas it increased by 142% when comparing the Control 
treatment with the Priority treatment.   
The probit results also illustrate the treatment differences as the statistically significant and 
positive coefficient on Priority indicates that the donation rate increases by between 31.5% and 
36.5%, depending on the model assumptions.  The statistically significant and positive 
coefficient on Opt-out with Priority indicates that the donation rate increases by between 42.8% 
and 45.1%, depending on the model assumptions.  Both of these coefficients are interpreted 
relative to the Control treatment so the relative gains observed under the Opt-out with Priority 
treatment must be purged of the Opt-out effect solely to be comparable to the Control versus 
Priority treatment.  Both of these results are consistent with those observed in Kessler and Roth 
(2012) as it is clearly evident that changing the allocation rule to a priority rule will increase the 
donor registration rate.  This said, these comparisons do raise the question of whether or not just 
using the rule Opt-out is capable of providing a similar gain as that observed when altering the 
allocation rule.  This is more formally investigated under our third research hypothesis.  
Our previous research hypotheses have illustrated that altering either the organ allocation rule, 
using a priority rule system, or the default choice, going from an Opt-in to an Opt-out program, 
will increase the organ donor registration rate.  The results from our Wilcoxon sign rank tests as 
well as the probit regressions clearly indicate that the organ donation rate is greater when 
comparing either the Opt-out treatment or the Priority treatment with the Control (opt-in) 
treatment.  From a public policy perspective it may be of interest whether or not the relative 
gains are comparable, as both policies require different forms of administrative change that may 
or may not be more palatable for different administrations and the populous.  On average going 
from the Control treatment to the Opt-out treatment increased the organ donation rate from 25.3% 
to 48.8% whereas going to the Priority treatment increased it to 61.3%.  This provides the first 
evidence that does not support our third research hypothesis that they generate equivalent 
marginal gains in the organ donor rate.  Our regression results further confirm this observation.  
Comparing the coefficient on the Opt-out treatment with the Priority treatment illustrates that in 
all the models estimated the Priority treatment coefficient is statistically significant and greater 
than the Opt-out treatment coefficient (p<0.01).  Therefore, our third research is not supported.  
However, it is important to note that changing the default choice, going from an Opt-in to an 
19 
 
Opt-out system, is able to generate approximately 80% of the gains achievable when altering the 
allocation rule.  Therefore, although it is not a 1-to-1 equivalent the gains are significant enough 
that policy makers may wish to consider changing just the default option versus the allocation 
rule if default option is a more palatable public policy. 
Investigating our third research hypothesis illustrated that sizable gains are achievable by 
changing either the allocation rule or the default choice, with the allocation rule outperforming 
the default choice by a small margin.  Our fourth research hypothesis investigates whether or not 
using either of these changes in isolation yields the same result as combining them and utilizing 
an Opt-out with Priority program.  Figure 2 clearly illustrates that Opt-out with Priority 
treatment outperforms both the Opt-out treatment and the Priority treatment separately, as it 
generated the highest donation rate of all the treatments.  This does not support our fourth 
research hypothesis, as it is clear that combining both changes exceeds either of them individual.  
Overall all the rounds the average donation rate was 70.8% for the Opt-out with Priority 
treatment, compared with 48.8% and 61.3% observed under the Opt-out and Priority treatments 
respectively.  This is also true when comparing the results from rounds 1-15 and rounds 16-30.  
Over the first 15 rounds, the Opt-out with Priority treatment had an average donation rate of 
73.2%, while the Opt-out treatment was 53.8% and the Priority treatment was 59.6%.  Over the 
last 15 rounds, the Opt-out with Priority treatment had an average donation rate of 68.4% while 
the Opt-out treatment was 43.9% and the Priority treatment was 63.0%.  
 The non-parametric test indicates that the Opt-out with Priority treatment outperforms all the 
other treatments and that the results are statistically significant.  It also shows that the Opt-out 
with Priority treatment generates statistically significantly higher donation registration rates than 
all the other treatments no matter if played first (rounds 1-15) or last (rounds 16-30).  The test 
statistics comparing the Opt-out treatment and the Priority treatment with the Opt-out with 
Priority treatment concretely invalidates our fourth research hypothesis, as it evident that in all 
cases the combined effect of the Opt-out with Priority treatment exceeds the constituent changes 
separately.  Results from the parametric tests in Table 5 are also consistent with this observation.  
The coefficient on Opt-out/priority in regression (1) is positive and highly statistically significant, 
representing that subjects are about 45% more likely to donate in the Opt-out with Priority 
treatment than in the Control treatment. Using estimates from regression (1), we find that Opt-
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out/priority also performs better than either Opt-out (p<0.01) or Priority (p<0.01) treatments 
separately. 
As mentioned earlier, our experiment is fundamentally different from Kessler and Roth’s 
(2012) experiment as it investigates the separable and combined effects of changing the 
allocation rule as well as the default option and it contextualizes the decision environment.  Our 
fifth and final research hypothesis investigates whether or not the abstract and contextual 
framing generate the same donor registration rates.   Our experimental results indicate that the 
contextual framing leads to a larger donor registration rate than a neutral framing.  Evidence of 
this can be seen in Figure 2, where the neutral framing donation rates are on average lower than 
those observed in the contextual framing treatment.  However, the differences are not as clear 
over rounds 1-15 as they are over rounds 16-30. 
The Wilcoxon rank sum tests and the probit regression results clarify this treatment effect.  
The non-parametric tests demonstrate that the Control treatment generates statistically 
significantly higher donation registration rates than the Neutral treatment.  This result is still 
statistically significant for all rounds and if we only focus on the first 15 rounds or the last 15 
round; the test statistics are 5.376, 2.362 and 5.431 for the respective partitions of the data.  The 
parametric tests estimate the likelihood of donation in each treatment.  The significant negative 
coefficient on Neutral in regression Model 1 indicates that subjects are about 10% less likely to 
register as a donor in the neutral-framed treatment than in the organ-framed treatment across all 
30 rounds.  When controlling for other covariates in the experiment, Models 2 through 5, this 
percentage decreases to around 5%.  Therefore using a neutral framing, as was conducted by 
Kessler and Roth (2012), will generate a lower rate of donor registration. 
Robustness of Results 
Table 5 also report results from probit regressions with controls for order effects, information 
of the previous round and demographic dummies.  Results are qualitatively the same when we 
add additional controls.  Regression (2) includes a control variable Second Treatment and its 
interactions with the treatment variables.  The significant negative coefficient on Second 
Treatment shows that subjects are 6% less likely to register when they played the Control 
treatment in the last 15 rounds.  The significant positive coefficient on the interaction term 
21 
 
Second Treatment*Priority indicate that the Priority treatment has an even stronger impact on 
the registration rate when it was played after subjects have participated in another organ-framed 
treatment.  
Regression (3) controls for the effect of earnings in the previous round on donation 
registration.  The significant positive coefficient on Earnings Last Round suggests earnings in 
the previous round have a positive impact on the donation decision.  Although subjects played 
multiple rounds in the experiment, only one round was randomly selected for payment at the end 
of each session.  Subjects’ donation decision should not be affected by their previous earnings.  
However, subjects could get information about others’ donation decision through receiving a B 
organ when needed in a previous period of the experiment.  We further included variables 
Received an Organ Last round and Benefit of Organ Received Last Round in regression (4).  The 
significant positive coefficient on Received an Organ Last Round shows that subjects are 5% 
more likely to donate if they received a B organ in previous round.  Since receiving a B organ 
leads to additional earnings, earnings of the previous round, especially earnings after receiving a 
B organ, affect the likelihood of donation (Received an Organ Last Round and Benefit of Organ 
Received Last Round are positive and significant at 10% level).  Regression (5) controls for 
demographic information of the subjects.  Among our selected subjects, whites are 8% more 
likely to register as a donor than all non-white races.  Subjects who were self-reported as organ 
donor in real life are 5% more like to register as a donor.  These two results are statistically 
significant. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
A fundamental limitation of the success of transplantation-based medical treatments is the supply 
of organs.  Although there have been sizeable gains in the development of immunosuppressant 
drugs that have increased the pool of potential candidates for a donated organ, there still exists an 
ever widening gap between the number of organ donors and the number of patients on the 
waiting list.  Recently, the transplantation community has made sizable gains in the utilization of 
donated organs (Howard et al., 2007; Shafer et al., 2008), but future changes in public policy 
may be required to increase the rate of organ donation within the United States in order to save 
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more lives.  Drawing from the experiences in other countries, changes in public policy can arise 
from either changing the allocation rule to provide priority for those who are registered donors or 
from changing the default choice from a standard opt-in to an opt-out system.  Furthermore, as is 
the case in Singapore, it is possible to combine both changes in the allocation rule and default 
choice.  The results from our experiment provide the first rigorous investigation of changing both 
the allocation rules and default choice separately as well as jointly.   
Our results are consistent with those previously observed in Kessler and Roth (2012), in that 
changing the allocation rule to a priority rule system yields a sizable increase in the organ 
donation rate.  We further extend this finding to illustrate that the priority rule generates a larger 
marginal gain than altering the default choice from an opt-in to an opt-out public policy.  In 
addition, we find that combining both an opt-out and priority rule policy will provide the largest 
gains in the organ donation rate and that gains are substantially different from the individual 
effect of each public policy change.  We further find evidence that the context of the experiment 
used to investigate the organ donation decision does matter with a contextualized decision 
environment yielding an increase in organ donation rates of around 5%. 
An important public policy finding is that our results illustrate that approximately 80% of the 
gains observed under a priority allocation rule are achievable by switching from an opt-in to an 
opt-out public policy.  This is extremely important from a public policy perspective as the costs, 
both pecuniary and psychological, associated these two possible changes may be substantially 
different.  A change in the allocation rule redefines the rules of whom is to receive priority for an 
organ which post-transplantation may invoke concepts of fairness and equality as enforcement of 
this rule may still rely on the deceased donors next-of-kin being amenable to their deceased’s 
donation preferences.  On the other hand, an opt-out policy redefines the rule of who owns a 
deceased’s individuals organs from the next-of-kin to the government.  The choice of which 
option is more appropriate is subject to the policy maker’s discretion and the constituents that 
they represent. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Two-by-Two Experimental Design 
 Opt-in Opt-out 
Without Priority Rule Control Treatment Opt-out Treatment 
With Priority Rule Priority Treatment 
Opt-out with Priority 
Treatment 
 
Table 2: Number of sessions for each treatment combination 
Treatment Rounds 
1-15 
Treatment Rounds 16-30 
 
Control Opt-out Priority 
Opt-out with 
Priority 
Neutral 
Control 3 Sessions 1 Session 1 Session 1 Session No Sessions 
Opt-out 1 Session No Sessions 1 Session 1 Session No Sessions 
Priority 1 Session 1 Session No Sessions 1 Session No Sessions 
Opt-out with 
Priority 
1 Session 1 Session 1 Session No Sessions No Sessions 
Neutral No Sessions No Sessions No Sessions No Sessions 3 Sessions 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the experiment  
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Round Profit 8100 9.216 9.83 -3 87 
Round Cost 8100 0.582 0.90 0 3 
Payment 8100 18.033 9.28 7 63.25 
Flier 8100 0.211 0.41 0 1 
Donation Registration Rate 8100 0.415 0.49 0 1 
      Control Treatment 
     Donation Registration Rate 2700 0.253 0.43 0 1 
      Opt-out Treatment 
     Donation Registration Rate 1350 0.488 0.50 0 1 
      Priority Treatment 
     Donation Registration Rate 1350 0.613 0.49 0 1 
      Opt-out with Priority Treatment 
     Donation Registration Rate 1350 0.708 0.45 0 1 
      Neutral Treatment 
     Donation Registration Rate 1350 0.178 0.38 0 1 
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Table 4: Wilcoxon rank-sum tests 
Pooled Data 
 
Rounds 1-15 
 
Rounds 16-30 
Treatment   Treatment 
Test 
Statistic 
 
Treatment   Treatment 
Test 
Statistic 
 
Treatment   Treatment 
Test 
Statistic 
Control vs Opt-out -14.988*** 
 
Control vs Opt-out -11.493*** 
 
Control vs Opt-out -9.713*** 
Control vs Priority -22.309*** 
 
Control vs Priority -13.895*** 
 
Control vs Priority -17.680*** 
Control vs 
Opt-out with 
Priority 
-27.818*** 
 
Control vs 
Opt-out with 
Priority 
-19.491*** 
 
Control vs 
Opt-out with 
Priority 
-19.897*** 
Control vs Neutral 5.376*** 
 
Control vs Neutral 2.362** 
 
Control vs Neutral 5.431*** 
Opt-out vs Priority -6.498*** 
 
Opt-out vs Priority -2.141** 
 
Opt-out vs Priority -7.036*** 
Opt-out vs 
Opt-out with 
Priority 
-11.656*** 
 
Opt-out vs 
Opt-out with 
Priority 
-7.402*** 
 
Opt-out vs 
Opt-out with 
Priority 
-9.102*** 
Priority vs 
Opt-out with 
Priority 
-5.241***   Priority vs 
Opt-out with 
Priority 
-5.298***   Priority vs 
Opt-out with 
Priority 
-2.121** 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 5: Probit regression on the decision to be a donor or not within the experiment; all 
variables are expressed as marginal values. 
 
Probit Estimation 
   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Opt-out 0.249*** 0.269*** 0.258*** 0.248*** 0.252*** 
 
(0.016) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Priority 0.365*** 0.323*** 0.322*** 0.311*** 0.315*** 
 
(0.015) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Opt-out/priority 0.451*** 0.450*** 0.437*** 0.428*** 0.431*** 
 
(0.014) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Neutral -0.098*** -0.058** -0.055** -0.055** -0.052** 
 
(0.017) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
      Second Treatment 
 
-0.058*** -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.065*** 
  
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Second Treatment*Opt-out 
 
-0.038 -0.030 -0.029 -0.023 
  
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) 
Second Treatment*Priority 
 
0.094*** 0.092*** 0.090*** 0.100*** 
  
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) 
Second Treatment*Opt-out/priority 
 
0.005 0.014 0.010 0.014 
  
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) 
Second Treatment*Neutral 
 
-0.091** -0.093** -0.088** -0.085** 
  
(0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) 
      Earnings Last Round 
  
0.003*** 0.001* 0.001* 
   
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Received an Organ Last Round 
   
0.047** 0.047** 
    
(0.021) (0.021) 
Benefit of Organ Received Last Round 
   
0.003* 0.003* 
    
(0.001) (0.001) 
      Male 
    
0.011 
     
(0.012) 
White 
    
0.076*** 
     
(0.019) 
Donor in Real Life 
    
0.050*** 
     
(0.012) 
      N 8100 8100 7830 7830 7801 
Chi2 1375.02 1425.66 1388.24 1416.61 1466.78 
Pseudo R2 0.1250 0.1297 0.1306 0.1333 0.1385 
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Figure 1: Illustration of the decision screen used in the experiment 
 
 
Figure 2: Percentage of donors in each treatment reported by round of the experiment. 
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Appendix A: Experimental Parameters 
Given the complexity of the decision environment we elected to simulate the decision 
environment to inform our parameterization of the experiment.  The most critical parameter in 
our experiment is the probability of organ failure.  There are two types of organ failure in our 
experiment.  Subjects with an A organ failure potentially provide transplantable organs for 
subjects with a B organ failure.  The ratio of the probability of B organ failure to the probability 
of A organ failure should be high enough to keep the scarcity of transplantable organs high, but it 
also cannot be too high because it will cancel out the incentive to donate in the Priority treatment.  
Figure A.1 shows the expected payoff difference between donors and non-donors for different 
parameter values in both the Control treatment and the Priority treatment (based on 100,000 
simulations of donation rate from 0% to 100% for each set of parameters).  The parameter values 
vary the ratio of the probability of B organ failure to the probability of A organ failure (Beta in 
Figure A.1).  
In Figure A.1, the teal blue line represents the expected payoff difference with the parameters 
actually used in the experiment (Beta=2), consistent with those used by Kessler and Roth (2012).  
In the Control treatment, being a donor is more costly that being a non-donor, which would 
predict no donation in the game.  Non-zero donation in the Control treatment would be the 
expression of altruistic motivation.  In the Priority treatment, the payoff difference is increasing 
with the donation rate.  It is worth noting that once Beta exceeds two the payoff difference start 
to fall off again and the benefits of being a donor are reduced.  The reason for these results is an 
increase in Beta generates an overwhelming gap between organ demand and supply.  Due to the 
high odds of having a B organ failure and the insufficient organ supply, the probability of dying 
while waiting for a B organ increases even for donors who have priority on the waiting list.  The 
incentive to donate provided by priority rule is canceled out, since having priority on the waiting 
list does not generate benefit any more. 
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                            Control Treatment                                                                      Priority Treatment       
 
FIGURE 2. SIMULATION RESULTS ACROSS PARAMETER SELECTION 
 
Figure A.1: Simulations payoff difference between being a donor and a non-donor for both the 
Control treatment (left panel) and Priority the treatment (right panel) while varying the 
percentage of donors (x-axis) as well as the ratio of the A organ failure to B organ failure (Beta).  
 
